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Abstract
Advertising is commonly regarded as a strategic tool to increase demand
and steal business from competitors. The present work studies the competi-
tive eﬀects of advertising in a two-period game with incomplete information
about the opponents cost structure. Bagwell and Ramey (1988) showed that
deterring entry is possible by signaling lower costs even if the post-entry game
is independent of the pre-entry advertising decision. Assuming that pre-entry
advertising by an entrant aﬀects the post-entry game, then the incumbent is
forced to do more than in the Bagwell/Ramey case to deter entry; he needs
to distort costs downwards more extensively. On the other hand, introductory
advertising does not facilitate entry if the entrant learns from the signal that
competition with the incumbent is unpro&table. In this case, the entrant ab-
stains from entry after performing introductory advertisng. Furthermore, if
the incumbent has private information on cost and advertising eﬀectiveness,
then he can deter entry by acting as if he had lower production costs and a
better advertising eﬀectiveness. In this scenario, entry deterrence is associ-
ated with overinvestment in advertising but not with limit pricing, which is a
new prediction. The use of multi-informational signals, i.e. pooled informa-
tion on more than one type of private information transferred by one signal, is
methodologically a new development of the classical signaling game.
I
1 Introduction
Advertising is a tool for incumbent firms to defend or extend their market position against
newcomers. On the other hand, newcomers can apply advertising as a tool to introduce
a new product. Bain (1949) developed the idea that brand loyalty is a critical aspect in
market entry. According to Bain, the incumbent can establish a credible threat of aggres-
sive competition by overinvesting in advertising, if he engages in high budgets before entry
to strengthen brand loyalty. However, as Schmalensee (1974) pointed out, this threat is
not credible. If a newcomer enters the market, it is not beneficial for the incumbent to
maintain a high advertising budget, even if he has engaged in overinvestment in adver-
tising prior to entry. Instead, it is better to accommodate with the entrant, and consider
overinvestment as sunk. As Needham (1974) clearly pointed out, advertising by the in-
cumbent before market entry only aﬀects the new firm’s entry decision if there is a definite
relation between this advertising and the entrant’s expected profit after entry. Because
such a relation does not exist, the incumbent’s eﬀort to deter entry by overinvestment in
advertising is regarded as ineﬀective.
In 1983, Schmalensee presented a new model showing that underinvestment in infor-
mative advertising can be a credible reputation of market power. However, this finding
was based on complete information on part of the consumers and potential entrants. They
need to be fully aware of the incumbent’s advertising eﬀorts. This prediction has two con-
sequences, neither of which is ultimately true: 1. The entrant knows the incumbent’s cost
and demand parameters. 2. Market participants observing the incumbent’s advertising
can categorize advertising perfectly into informative and persuasive classes. However,
advertising cannot be perfectly classified in this regard, as it always contains features of
both and because consumers have diﬀerent perceptions. Therefore, it is not reasonable to
derive results based on classifications of consumer perceptions.
The impossibility of classifying advertising is obviously due to the fact that consumers
have diﬀerent awareness of a firm’s product and brand, and because of diﬀerent percep-
tions of qualitative product features. In an attempt to measure the level of information
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consumers have about a large number of brands and their quality perceptions, Clark et
al. (2007) found that advertising significantly aﬀects brand awareness, but not perceived
quality. At first glance, this result seems strange. If advertising outlays are not correlated
to perceived quality, then firms with lower advertising budgets may be able to achieve a
higher perceived quality for their brands than more intensively advertising firms. This
would be quite in accordance with Hertzendorf’s (1993) finding that quality perception
is not necessarily a result of the amount of advertising spend. On the other hand, it
is questionable why advertising significantly increases brand awareness in the study by
Clark et al. (2007), but not perceived quality. According to Hertzendorf, more awareness
resulting from high advertising levels should antagonize biased quality perception. In this
regard, the study by Clark et al. (2007) is obviously in conflict with Hertzendorf. Another
study by Moorthy and Zhao (2000) made the contrary finding that advertising outlays are
significantly associated with perceived quality. These findings show that economic state-
ments based on advertising classifications are unreliable. It is therefore wise to abstain
from classifications of this kind.
Bagwell and Ramey (1988) presented a new idea related to advertising as a tool for
entry deterrence. They did not specify information technology or demand eﬀects of adver-
tising. This is important as the relation of advertising eﬀects and consumer preferences is
in conflict with generalized model assumptions. Bagwell/Ramey’s model focused on the
asymmetry of a specific information between entrant and incumbent, namely the incum-
bent’s production cost. This idea resulted in axiomatic conclusions about the application
of advertising in market entry scenarios. Accordingly, advertising can be a signal for true
information about the incumbent’s production cost and demand situation (Bagwell and
Ramey, 1988 and 1994). In this scenario, the incumbent can signal truthfully by overin-
vesting in advertising. The overinvestment distorts the incumbent’s true production cost
downwards, and allows him to present himself as a low-cost firm, not contestable by an
entrant. Overinvestment in advertising occurs to signal true information, and does not
depend on a threat. However, some questions remain unanswered, namely i) can the
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entrant benefit from carrying out advertising prior to entry? and ii) can the incumbent
more eﬃciently deter entry by signaling more than one type of private information? It
may be profitable to signal more than one type of information. It is therefore the aim of
the present work to provide a model of multi-informational signaling for the examination
of a broader class of entry scenarios.
The remaining part of the article is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the case
of pre-entry advertising on part of the entrant. In section 3, we provide the character-
ization of separating equilibria for the case of multi-informational signals. That is, the
incumbent sends signals on two kinds of private information, cost level and advertising
eﬀectiveness. Section 4 summarizes the results.
2 Pre-entry advertising and entry deterrence
Empirical evidence supports both views of advertising. Firstly, advertising for new prod-
ucts facilitates entry and erode the incumbent’s market position. Secondly, advertising is
used as an entry deterrence strategy by established firms through overinvestment. Studies
showed that i) market admission by new firms or products caused a response by incum-
bent firms, mostly by increasing advertising eﬀorts (Telser, 1962; Alemson, 1970; Cubbin
and Domberger, 1988, Thomas, 1999), ii) advertising facilitated market entry (Telser,
1962; Ferguson, 1967; Alemson, 1970), iii) new entry contributed to decreasing market
prices (Alemson, 1970), but also that iv) introductory advertising led to unsuccessful
entry (Telser, 1962; Alemson, 1970). In some industries, it was also observed that incum-
bents’ response to entry failed to appear, if entry is small-scale (Thomas, 1999), and that
new entry was not accompanied by intensive advertising (Brown, 1978). The fourth (iv)
observation limits the potential of introductory advertising, and suggests that newcomers
may consider to abstain from market admission even after carrying out advertising, if
competition with the incumbent firms in later stages would be unprofitable. This is an
important aspect as advertising has the characteristics of an irreversible investment. In a
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world of uncertainty, expected profitability can be positive for a newcomer, although neg-
ative thereafter. This could induce a newcomer to test a market by applying marketing,
but abstain from entry after receiving additional information and sink advertising.
The empirical studies have shown that the level of advertising outlays increases in the
light of imminent entry. Theoretical analysis has confirmed that increasing advertising
is a rational response to the threat of entry (Bagwell/Ramey, 1988). It is interesting to
analyze the question of how introductory advertising by newcomers aﬀects the incumbent’s
entry deterrence behavior in a theoretical model like that of Bagwell and Ramey. To
investigate this question, we extended the signaling model by Bagwell and Ramey (1988)
by introducing entrant advertising. The model used to answer the question is no longer
a standard signaling game, since the uninformed party makes one of its key decisions
simultaneously with the informed party. The actual entry decision is the second key
decision of the uninformed party. Thus, the advertising choice of the uninformed party is
based on its prior beliefs and its expectations as to the kind of equilibrium being played.
2.1 The model
Assume the model by Bagwell and Ramey (1988) with an incumbent (firm I) operating
solely on a market where consumers can be influenced by the provision of advertising. The
incumbent is privately informed about his marginal costs, indicated by ciI with i ∈ {L,H}.
A potential competitor (firm E) does not know the incumbent’s true costs, but knows that
it is one of the two possible states cHI and cLI . Also, firm E has a belief of the distribution
of states given by the common knowledge prior probability distribution bρ (ciI) ∈ [0, 1].
The entrant’s posterior belief that the incumbent operates with high cost is indicated by
ρ (AI) ∈ [0, 1], which is calculated by Bayes’ rule. The entrant can advertise prior to entry
simultaneously to the incumbent’s first period action, and first-period advertising aﬀects
second-period sales. After observing the incumbent’s advertising decision, the challenger
may choose either to enter the market, or not to enter. In the case of entry, the firms set
to duopoly behavior in the second stage of the game, and they compete for market shares
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based on their pre-entry advertising spend.
In the first-stage, the entrant calculates profitability of pre-entry advertising based
on prior beliefs. This calculation aﬀects the equilibrium path, which in turn determines
the incumbent’s considerations as to the kind of equilibrium being played. Let type i’s
first-period equilibrium signal be depicted by ( eP iI , eAiI), and let the entrant’s strategy be a
tuple of actions (A1E, α), where A1E is the entrant’s first-period advertising and α the entry
decision, with α = 1 for entry. First-period advertising enables the entrant to attract sales
in the second period by stealing some business from the incumbent (∂πiE/∂A1E > 0 and
∂πiD/∂A1E < 0). For the sake of simplicity, there is no dilution of advertising eﬀects over
the two periods.
Let the incumbent’s demand be a continuous function XI (PI , AI) depending on price
and advertising. According to Bagwell and Ramey, the incumbent’s first-period profit
function is defined by:
πiI (PI , AI) = (PI − ciI)XI (PI , AI)−AI (1)
with (P iI , AiI) as the unique first-period maximizer. The profit function has a unique
maximum. Cross-eﬀects are so small that optimal price is positively (and optimal ad-
vertising negatively) associated with changes in marginal costs c. Demand is assumed
to be decreasing in price and increasing in advertising. The entrant chooses to join the
market only if the incumbent operates with high cost, and we assume the following order
of second-period entrant profits: 0 < πLE < F < πHE . The type-dependent incumbent’s
second-period duopoly profits may have the following relation: πLD > πHD > 0.
2.2 Optimality conditions for signaling equilibria
In our entry game, the incumbent has to choose a price-advertising combination in the first
period as the best response to the entrant’s entry and first-period advertising decision.
The first condition for a signaling equilibrium is thus as follows.
Condition 1 (Optimality for the incumbent) The incumbent with cost level i ∈ {L,H}
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chooses a price-advertising combination
³ eP iI , eAiI´ in the first period such that for all
A1E ∈ <+: ³ eP iI , eAiI´ ∈ arg max
(PI ,AI)
©
πiI (PI , AI) + δ [EI ]
ª
with EI = α (PI , AI , A1E) πiD + (1− α (PI , AI , A1E)) [πiI (P iI , AiI)].
The entrant may choose an advertising level according to the prior probability dis-
tribution simultaneous with the incumbent’s first-period action. Since competition with
a low-cost incumbent is unprofitable, the challenger enters only when he observes the
low-cost signal. Thus we get the following condition.
Condition 2 (Optimal advertising for the entrant) The entrant chooses an adver-
tising level eA1E ∈ <+ in the first period to maximize the expected profit from period two
under prior beliefs:
eA1E ∈ argmaxA1E
n
δ bEE −A1Eo
with bEE = bρπHE (A1E) + (1− bρ)πLE (A1E)− F
and with πLE = 0 if bρπHE (A1E) + (1− bρ)πLE (A1E)−A1E > F .
eA1E is positive only if bρπHE (A1E) + (1− bρ)πLE (A1E) − A1E > F . However, in this case,
the equilibrium is separating, and the entrant enters only if the incumbent reveals to be
high-cost. Thus, we need to consider πLE = 0 in this case. Consistency of beliefs is given
by Bayes’ rule. If
³ ePLI , eALI ´ 6= ³ ePHI , eAHI ´ then ρ³ ePLI , eALI ´ = 0 and ρ³ ePHI , eAHI ´ = 1 and
if
³ ePLI , eALI ´ = ³ ePHI , eAHI ´ then ρ³ ePLI , eALI ´ = bρ. The first case is referred to as separating
equilibrium.
The entry decision at the beginning of the second period is independent of the cost
of pre-entry advertising as it is irreversible in the second period. The entrant decides to
enter if the expected profit under posterior beliefs covers the investment F , as expressed
in Condition 3.
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Condition 3 (Optimal entry) eα (PI , AI , A1E) = 1, for all (PI , AI), if EE > F , with
EE = ρπHE + (1− ρ)πLE −A1E.
If entry is unprofitable under prior beliefs (bρ) the equilibrium can be separating or
pooling. If Condition 3 is fulfilled under prior beliefs, and if the incumbent is a low-
cost type, the entrant does not enter. The entrant has to consider this in his optimality
condition such that πLE = 0 under our requirements in this specific case. Consequently,
the game always results in a separating equilibrium if the entrant’s advertising spend is
positive.
2.3 Separating equilibria
Assume Condition (3) is fulfilled under prior beliefs. Then, entry is profitable to the
entrant before observing the incumbent’s signal, i.e.:
bρπHE ¡A1E¢+ (1− bρ) πLE ¡A1E¢−A1E > F
In this case, the game’s outcome must be a separating equilibrium and the challenger
enters only if he observes the high-cost signal. In the case of entry, the firms set to duopoly
behavior. In the first period, the entrant does not know the incumbent’s true costs, but
chooses an advertising level according to the objective:
max
A1E
G = bρπHE ¡A1E¢−A1E
We assume that competition with a low-cost incumbent remains unprofitable to the
entrant, even after advertising (i.e. πLE (A1E) < F ∀ A1E), to look at the interesting case
where signaling by the incumbent determines the entrant’s entry decision. We can then
find the incumbent’s best response to the entrant’s first-period advertising decision by
setting ρ (PI , AI) = 1 for (PI , AI) 6=
³ ePLI , eALI ´, and Condition 1 is satisfied for ciI = cHI
in any separating equilibrium if:
πHI
³ ePLI , eALI ´ ≤ (1− δ)πHI ¡PHI , AHI ¢+ δπHD ¡AHI , A1E¢ ≡ eπHI (2)
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where δ is the discount factor. Let eH be the set of ³ ePLI , eALI ´ satisfying (2). Further-
more, Condition 1 is satisfied for ciI = cLI in any separating equilibrium if:
πLI
³ ePLI , eALI ´ ≥ (1− δ)πLI ¡PLI , ALI ¢+ δπLD ¡ALI , A1E¢ ≡ eπLI (3)
Let the set of
³ ePLI , eALI ´ satisfying (3) be indicated as eL. We look for pairs ³ ePLI , eALI ´ ∈eH∩eL that constitute separating equilibria. Also, we look at the interesting case ¡PLI , ALI ¢ /∈eH.
Corresponding to Bagwell and Ramey (1988), the low-cost incumbent may choose
any
³ ePLI , eALI ´ in eH ∩ eL by the threat of certain entry following a deviation, and we
look for elements not dominated by others. An element that fulfills this requirement
is located at the intersection point of eπHI and ψI (cI) = (PI (cI) , AI (cI)), where the
latter determines the location of complete-information price-advertising combinations that
maximize the incumbent’s profit at diﬀerent cost levels. The following proposition tells
us the equilibrium strategies.
Proposition 1 Let
¡
PLI , ALI
¢
/∈ eH, if δ bEE > F + A1E then the unique undominated
separating equilibrium consists of½³eP iI , eAiI´i=L,H | ³ ePLI , eALI ´ = (PI (cI) , AI (cI)) ,³ ePHI , eAHI ´ = ¡PHI , AHI ¢
¾
such that cI < cLI .
The proof is available in the Appendix. The diﬀerence between Theorem 2 of Bagwell
and Ramey and Proposition 1 is that cI < c0I , i.e. the cost distortion necessary to deter
entry is larger in the context of pre-entry advertising. (PI (c0I) , AI (c0I)) = (P 0I , A0I) can
be chosen profitably by the high-cost incumbent. Therefore, in the light of challenging
entrant advertising, (P 0I , A0I) cannot be a separating equilibrium anymore.
Proposition 2 The undominated separating equilibrium stated in Proposition 1 contains
a cost distortion of cI < c0I < cLI .
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Figure 1 shows two isoprofit curves for the high-cost incumbent. The exterior curve
is eπHI = πHI (P I , AI), which determines the the case of A1E > 0. The interior curve maps
the case A1E = 0, depicted as πHI = πHI (P 0I , A0I).
H
Iπ
~ HIπ
1
2
3
4
( )II cψ
IA
IPIP
IA
( )00 , IILI APπ
0
IP
0
IA
( )IILI AP ,π
Figure 1: The undominated seperating equilibrium if AE > 0. Legend: (1)
¡
PHI , AHI
¢
, (2)¡
PLI , ALI
¢
, (3) (P 0I , A0I), (4) (P I , AI) =
³ ePLI , eALI ´.
Introductory entrant advertising causes the incumbent to react with an expansion of
his own advertising eﬀort. The low-cost incumbent’s eﬀort to deter entry is larger than
that required if there is no entrant advertising. Entry deterrence is thus more costly to the
low-cost incumbent in the light of entrant advertising. Accommodation with the entrant
is less attractive to the low-cost incumbent as long as eH∩eL is not empty. The incumbent’s
cost distortion necessary to deter entry depends on the level of advertising provided by
the challenger. The more the entrant advertises the more he steals business from the
incumbent. If advertising by the entrant would not be eﬃcient under prior beliefs, then
(P 0I , A0I), the equilibrium price-advertising pair in the non-entrant-advertising case, would
be the unique separating equilibrium.
Another interesting feature of the present model is that the entrant does not join
the market if he observes the low-cost signal, even though he has advertised in the first
period. In fact, this outcome is a consequence of the players’ rational behavior. A potential
entrant should perform advertising when the expected profit is positive. Advertising prior
to entry is always risky, and we may observe in reality that potential entrants enter the
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previously advertised market not knowing if the attempt will be profitable. However,
we learned that it is not always rational to enter the market, even if advertising has
already been performed. In the moment true information is revealed, advertising outlays
are sunk and cannot be included in the entry decision anymore. In the real world, such
introductory advertising may be carried out by newcomers under similar conditions of
incomplete information, but entry may occur despite competition is not profitable. It is
thus beneficial to abstain from entry even if advertising outlays have been performed.
3 Multi-informational signaling of cost level and ad-
vertising eﬀectiveness
The present study sought to take another option for increasing barriers to entry into
account, namely the exploitation of private information on more than one aspect. The
consideration of multi-informational signaling is methodologically a relatively new and
scarcely examined approach. Few papers have been published on this approach, which is
also called multi-dimensional signaling. However, this term is used for diﬀerent scenarios,
e.g. for the case of one type of private information and two or more signals (Wilson 1985,
McNally 1999), and a continuum of characteristcs of one private information type (Quinzii
and Rochet, 1985). As the term ”multi” here refers to the number of types of private
information transferred by one or more signals, we call the game a multi-informational
signaling game. In this category of games, Quinzii and Rochet (1985) revisited the Spence
(1973) labor market signaling model to show that a separating equilibrium exist, and that
there is a qualitative diﬀerence in the results between the signaling of one and multiple
types of information. Chen (1997) presented a model in which firms have private infor-
mation as to cost level and demand. He found that separating equilibria are diﬃcult to
derive, and that most equilibria are ”hybrid” in nature. That is, an equilibrium can be
separating regarding one information type and pooling reagrding the other. Thus, in his
model both aspects of private information can give rise to diﬀerent and separate signals.
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In contrast, in our model the incumbent is able to exploit his knowledge over two kinds of
private information in a unique separating equilibrium to increase profits compared with
the benchmark outcome of one-type information signaling.
For comparison with the benchmark outcome, we modified the model presented above
by considering cost and advertising eﬀectiveness as private information. Whereas, pre-
entry entrant advertising is not considered. We found that in this scenario, the incumbent
plays advertising enhancement, but not limit pricing, which is a new prediction. Simul-
taneously, the inclumbent can gain profits. The rationale may be that the incumbent
suﬀers a loss from overinvestment in advertising, but regains profits by maintaining a
monopoly-like price level. Thus, the application of multi-informational signaling enables
the incumbent to enforce price stability that compensates for advertising overinvestment.
An interesting aspect in this model is the aspect of advertising eﬀectiveness. As
information is an economic good, and advertising is a source of information, we would
expect more intensive advertising for new products as they need greater publicity than
established ones. On the other hand, established firms may respond by more intensive
advertising to increase sales and steal business, as was observed in the cigarette industry
in the first half of the twentieth century (see Telser, 1962). These considerations include
aspects of the impact of advertising’s persuasive eﬀects. To include these considerations
in a model, we need to spell out concrete relations of return to advertising and consumer
interaction, which are not considered in the present model.
Assuming that both advertising eﬀectiveness and marginal cost can be either high or
low, then there can be four kinds of incumbent types: i) high cost and high eﬀectiveness,
ii) high cost and low eﬀectiveness, iii) low cost and high eﬀectiveness and iv) low cost
and low eﬀectiveness. The natural idea would be to assume that ii and iv are the most
frequently observed constellations in reality. In fact, these are also the most interesting
constellations, as we want to examine whether the low-cost incumbent may have another
option to deter entry or increase profitability. Therefore, we restrict the analysis to the
two incumbent types specified in ii and iv.
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3.1 The model
In this section, we want to show that the low-cost incumbent’s equilibrium strategy
changes if both incumbent types fiﬀer in production cost and advertising eﬀectiveness. To
make the strategy change explicit we take the Bagwell/Ramey equilibrium (depicted by
point 3 in Figure 2) as benchmark, where incumbent types diﬀer in cost only. According
to the Bagwell/Ramey case, first-period advertising has no eﬀect on second-period sales
again.
To make explicit that the incumbent’s demand also depends on the eﬀectiveness of
advertising, let X i (P,A) depicting the incumbent’s demand at cost level i ∈ {L,H}, with
price P and advertising level A, and XL (P,A) = XH (P,A) + bA with b > 0, ∀A > 0.
We save subscript I depicting the incumbent’s strategies and profits as there is no second
player’s first period action. We only keep subscript E to denote second-period entrant
profits and D for incumbent’s second-period duopoly profits. Let the entrant be fully
informed about the eﬀects of type-dependent advertising, such that he is able to assign
any profit-maximizing price-advertising pair to a particular profit level. The incumbent’s
first-period profit function is defined as follows:
πi (P,A) = (P − ci)X i (P,A)−A (4)
with ∂X/∂A > 0 and ∂XL/∂A > ∂XH/∂A ∀A > 0. By this specification, the optimal
level of advertising shifts upwards with increasing advertising eﬀectiveness. Modification
of the optimal low-cost advertising condition ∂XH/∂A+ b = 1/(P − cL) yields:
P − cL
P ηXH ,A
µ
1 + b ∂A∂X
¶
=
A
PXH
which is a variant of the Dorfman-Steiner equation showing that the relation of ad-
vertising to revenue is scaled up by the term in brackets. Thus, optimal advertising and
monopoly profits increase in line with more eﬀective advertising. In turn, firms with less
eﬀective advertising have to advertise more than more eﬀectively advertising firms to gen-
erate the same amount of sales. Consequently, higher advertising eﬀectiveness increases
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optimal advertising and price in <2+ = P ×A, and thereby induces ψ (c) to shift upwards,
as shown in Figure 2.
1
2
IA
IP
HH XP
HH XA
( )Hcψ
( )Lcψ
1‘
2‘
LH XA
LH XP
Figure 2: Advertising eﬀectiveness shifts ψ (ci).
The optimality conditions for sequential Bayesian equilibria are as follows.
Condition 1 (Optimality for the incumbent) ∀i ∈ {L,H}:³ eP i, eAi´ ∈ argmax
(P,A)
©
πi (P,A) + δ
£
απiD + (1− α)πi
¡
P i, Ai
¢¤ª
Condition 2 (Optimality for the entrant) α (P,A) = 1, for all (P,A), if EE > F ,
with EE = ρπHE + (1− ρ)πLE.
Third condition requires consistency of beliefs in the way as stated in the previous
section.
3.2 Separating equilibria
Taking the case of identical advertising eﬀectiveness as benchmark, we will see that equi-
librium strategies change. This is because position and shape of isoprofit curve πH change
when advertising eﬀectiveness change. Let us depict the new curve by bπH . Then, we can
define the conditions for a separating equilibrium as follows:
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πH
³ ePL, eAL´ ≤ (1− δ)πH ¡PH , AH¢+ δπHD ≡ bπH (5)
and:
πL
³ ePL, eAL´ ≥ (1− δ)πL ¡PL, AL¢+ δπLD ≡ bπL (6)
Let bL be the set of ³ ePL, eAL´ satisfying (5) and bH be the set of ³ ePL, eAL´ satisfying
(6). Under our extension of the benchmark model, as discussed above, low-cost sales
extend high-cost sales by bA. bπH is not identical to πH in the benchmark case by lowered
advertising eﬀectiveness. So as to examine the most interesting scenario again, we assume
that
¡
PL, AL
¢
/∈ bH. Moreover, we define bπH to ”intersect” ψ ¡cL¢ at ³ bP, bA´, the first-
period maximizer at cost-level bc [1]. We know from the proof of Proposition 2 that the
equilibrium price-advertising pair is located on bπH and thus πH ³ bP, bA´ = πH ³ ePL, eAL´.
We are then prepared to find the element that maximizes the low-cost incumbent’s profits
on bπH , which is the game’s unique undominated separating equilibrium ³ ePL, eAL´. The
following proposition tells us the properties of this equilibrium.
Proposition 3 Let advertising be more eﬀective to the low-cost than to the high-cost
incumbent’s sales, with XH (P,A) = XL (P,A) − bA, and let
¡
PL, AL
¢
/∈ bH, then the
unique undominated separating equilibrium is not located on ψ
¡
cL
¢
, but above of it, and
the strategy profile is characterized by:³ ePL, eAL´ 6= ³ bP, bA´ ∧ πL ³ ePL, eAL´ > πL ¡P 0, A0¢ ∧ πH ³ ePL, eAL´ = πH ³ bP, bA´
³ ePH , eAH´ = ¡PH , AH¢
with c0 < bc < cL, where ³ bP, bA´ = (P (bc) , A (bc)) is the first-period maximizers under cost
level bc and sales schedule XL.
14
Thus, the equilibrium price-advertising pair
³ ePL, eAL´ located on bπH provides the
low-cost incumbent a higher profit than that of the benchmark equilibrium under equally
eﬀective advertising. Also, it contains a cost distortion to c = bc > c0, which is smaller than
in the benchmark equilibrium. Put diﬀerently, it is profitable for the low-cost incumbent
to act as if his advertising is more eﬀective than it really is. If he does so, then the
unique separating equilibrium essentially involves a cost distortion smaller than in the
Bagwell/Ramey case where advertising is equally eﬀective among the incumbent types.
Another interesting conclusion from Proposition 3 is that the equilibrium is no more
located on ψ
¡
cL
¢
, but on a hypothetical crestline ψ
¡
cLL
¢
located above ψ
¡
cL
¢
, as shown
in Figure 3. Also, a special feature of this equilbrium is that equlibrium profits rise with
increasing diﬀerence in advertising eﬀectiveness as it shifts the equilibrium closer to the
low-cost incumbent’s first-period maximizer. The suﬃcient condition for the equilibrium
to exist results from Theorem 3 in Bagwell/Ramey, namely πL (P 0, A0) ≥ bπL, together
with πL
³ bP, bA´ > πL (P 0, A0).
Figure 3 provides an illustration of the equilibrium, which is located above the crestline
ψ
¡
cL
¢
. The figure is plotted by Maple using a numerical example [2]. The benchmark
equlibrium, where only cost is private information, is located in point (1), while the multi-
informational equilibrium is represented by point (2). The new equilibrium (2) is located
closer to the low-cost incumbent first-period maximizer (4), and above crestline ψ
¡
cL
¢
.
In summary, the unique undominated separating equilibrium, which is displayed in
Figure 3, shows a distortion in cost and advertising eﬀectiveness in such a way that the
low-cost incumbent acts as if he has lower cost and a higher advertising eﬀectiveness.
Hypothetically curve ψ
¡
cLL
¢
runs above ψ
¡
cL
¢
, and subtends at
³ ePL, eAL´, containing
the low-cost equilibrium pair. The eﬀect of equilibrium strategies on price and advertising
outlays is inconclusive. By mimicking higher advertising eﬀectiveness, the game results
in an increase of advertising spend, but eﬀect on price is unclear. Since ψ
¡
cLL
¢
runs
above ψ
¡
cL
¢
, and the equilibrium shifts upwards, prices close to monopoly level are
possible. Thus, mimicking higher advertising eﬀectiveness enables the incumbent to regain
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Figure 3: The undominated separating equilibrium under diﬀerently eﬀective advertising.
Legend: (1) (P 0, A0), (2)
³ ePL, eAL´, (3) ³ bP, bA´, (4) ¡PL, AL¢, (5) ©¡PH , AH¢ ¯¯XLª, (6)©¡
PH , AH
¢ ¯¯
XH
ª
.
a fraction of his price decrement he incurs by deterring entry through signaling low cost.
4 Conclusions
We have examined several related scenarios of entry deterrence in the context of private
information and signaling through advertising. At first, we analyzed the behavior of a
monopolist facing imminent entry by a firm being able to advertise prior to entry. The
result of this case shows that a potential entrant can benefit from introductory advertising
by reserving some future demand, and thereby stealing business from the incumbent. It
turned out that competition is intensified, accompanied by decreasing pre-entry price
and increasing pre-entry advertising, compared with the benchmark case where entrant
advertising is absent. Despite entrant advertising can take oﬀ some second-period business
from the incumbent, he is still able to deter entry, although it is more costly to do so.
A potential challenger is unlikely to generate positive profits from undertaking pre-entry
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advertising, if the incumbent is able to play an entry deterrence strategy. Therefore, he
does better to abstain from entry.
A specific issue of the introductory advertising scenario analysed here is that the
entrant makes one of his key decisions (i.e. the advertising decision) without receiving a
signal on the incumbent’s type. However, the entrant can make a decision on expected
profits, and complete information is revealed in the model before entry. Thus, the entrant
is actually better equipped with information than in the real world, as it enables the
entrant to abstain from market entry if competition with the incumbent turns out to be
unprofitable, and thereby to avoid another financial loss in addition to the sunk advertising
costs. Thus, the model can explain why an entrant should sometimes abstain from entry,
even if he has carried out introductory advertising.
In a second scenario, we examined if the incumbent is able to render entry deterrence
more profitable by imitating lower costs and greater advertising eﬀectiveness. In the en-
try deterrence strategy with distortion of more than one information type, incumbent’s
advertising is increased, similar as in the benchmark outcome of one-type information
signaling, but there is no limit pricing. By acting as if his costs were lower and adver-
tising eﬀectiveness would be greater, the incumbent is able to counterbalance the costs
of overinvestment in advertising by maintaining his price level. This is a new prediction,
showing that limit pricing is not a necessary entry deterrence strategy associated with
overinvestment in advertising.
We have analysed two variants of Bagwell-Ramey entry game by consideration of en-
trant advertising on the one hand and diﬀerent advertising eﬀectiveness on the other.
Both scenarios have eﬀects on the high-cost imcumbent’s profits resulting in location
changes of the isoprofit curve πH . It is an interesting finding that the two scenarios
have opposite eﬀects on equlibrium profits, despite both scenarios act in a profit-reducing
manner on the high-cost incumbent. While πH is ”expanding” in appearance of entrant
advertising, it ”shrinks” in case of diﬀerent advertising eﬀectiveness. The reason for this
unexpected finding is caused by the diﬀerent eﬀects of advertising. Entrant advertising
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reduces second-period duopoly profits, while a reduction in advertising eﬀectiveness re-
duces first-period monopoly profit. In the first case, profit in the same ”profit range” is
reduced, while in the second case the entire ”profit range” of the high-cost incumbent is
reduced. The latter eﬀect causes the high-cost incumbent’s level curves to run markedly
lower, resulting in isoprofit curves to ”shrink”.
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Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1. Since the proof of Proposition 1 is largely analogous to
the proof of Theorem 2 in Bagwell and Ramey (1988) we constrict it to the main steps.
At first we have to show monotonicity of the high-cost incumbent’s profit function for
all cost-levels cI < cHI on ψI (cI) in order to establish the intersection point of eπHI and
ψI (cI) at (PI (cI) , AI (cI)) as the necessary condition for the equilibrium. Following can
be shown: XI (P I , AI) > XI
¡
P I , AI
¢
with (P I , AI) ≡ (PI (cI) , AI (cI)) and
¡
P I , AI
¢
≡
(PI (cI) , AI (cI)) and cI < cI < cHI . If using:¡
P I − cI
¢
XI
¡
P I , AI
¢
−AI − (P I − cI)XI (P I , AI) +AI > 0 (A1)
we can write by simple modification of A1:¡
P I − cHI
¢
XI
¡
P I , AI
¢
−AI −
¡
P I − cHI
¢
XI (P I , AI) +AI > 0 (A2)
A1 added with:
(P I − cI)XI (P I , AI)−AI −
¡
P I − cI
¢
XI
¡
P I , AI
¢
+AI > 0
yields XI (P I , AI) > XI
¡
P I , AI
¢
, which proves monotonicity and thereby it proves that
an intersection point of ψI (cI) and eπHI indeed exists.
The next step is to show that the low-cost incumbent’s equilibrium choice is located
on eπHI . We can show this by contradiction. We know that (P I , AI) is located on eπHI .
Assuming
³ ePLI , eALI ´ is not located on eπHI such that πHI ³ ePLI , eALI ´ < eπHI then we can
write: ³ ePLI − cHI ´XI ³ ePLI , eALI ´− eALI − ¡P I − cHI ¢XI (P I , AI) +AI < 0
However, by definition
³ ePLI , eALI ´ is the equilibrium combination not dominated by another
strategy. Therefore,
³ ePLI , eALI ´ maximizes the cLI -incumbent’s profit on eH∩ eL and we have
to write: ³ ePLI − cLI ´XI ³ ePLI , eALI ´− eALI − ¡P I − cLI ¢XI (P I , AI) +AI ≥ 0 (A3)
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But this cannot be if πHI
³ ePLI , eALI ´ < eπHI . Since ¡PLI , ALI ¢ /∈ eH we have:³ ePLI − cLI ´XI ³ ePLI , eALI ´− eALI − ¡P I − cLI ¢XI (P I , AI) +AI < 0
which is a contradiction and proves that A3 must be correct. Otherwise
³ ePLI , eALI ´ is not
an equilibrium.
Finally, we can complete the proof by showing that the unique undominated equi-
librium is located at (P I , AI), i.e. (P I , AI) =
³ ePLI , eALI ´. Choosing (PI , AI) such that
πHI (PI , AI) = eπHI we can write:¡
P I − cHI
¢
XI (P I , AI)−AI −
¡
PI − cHI
¢
XI (PI , AI) +AI = 0 (A4)
and:
(P I − cI)XI (P I , AI)−AI − (PI − cI)XI (PI , AI) +AI > 0 (A5)
Adding A4 and A5 yields: (cHI − cI) [X (P I , AI)−XI (PI , AI)] > 0. However, using A4
we get by simple modification:
¡
P I − cLI
¢
XI (P I , AI)−AI −
¡
PI − cLI
¢
XI (PI , AI) +AI
= (cHI − cI) [XI (P I , AI)−XI (PI , AI)] > 0
which is a contradiction to A4 and therefore proves that (P I , AI) uniquely maximizes
πLI (PI , AI) on eπHI , i.e. ³ ePLI , eALI ´ is the unique undominated equilibrium.
The suﬃcient condition for the equilibrium is given by πLI
¡
PLI , ALI
¢
− πLD
¡
ALI , A1E
¢
≥
πHI
¡
PHI , AHI
¢
− πHD
¡
AHI , A1E
¢
. If this is the case, then
¡
PLI , ALI
¢
is located within eL with
certainty and therefore it is element of eH∩ eL, as required. The proof in brief is as follows.
Starting from:
πLI (P I , AI) + δπLD
¡
PLI , ALI
¢
− πLI
¡
PLI , ALI
¢
− δπLD
¡
ALI , A1E
¢
(A6)
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we would expect that this expression is positive or at least equals zero since πLI
³ ePLI , eALI ´ ≥eπLI . Subtraction of A6 by πHI (P I , AI)− eπHI , which actually equals zero, as well as recom-
bination of terms and cancelling down leads to: (cHI −cLI )X (P I , AI)−XI
¡
PLI , ALI
¢
. Since
the adding of the following two inequations, which are valid due to monotonicity:
(P I − cI)XI (P I , AI)−AI −
¡
PLI − cI
¢
XI
¡
PLI , ALI
¢
+ALI > 0
¡
PLI − cLI
¢
XI
¡
PLI , ALI
¢
−ALI −
¡
P I − cLI
¢
XI (P I , AI) +AI > 0
yields following inequation: (cLI −cI)
£
X (P I , AI)−XI
¡
PLI , ALI
¢¤
> 0, we can immediately
conclude that A6 must be positive too. This proves that (P I , AI) ∈ eL. Thus, together
with the result from the proof that (P I , AI) =
³ ePLI , eALI ´ we have shown that (P I , AI)
is the unique undominated separating equilibrium, which will be chosen by the low-cost
incumbent in the context of preentry advertising (A1E > 0).
Proof of Proposition 2. If entry is profitable under prior beliefs, it is easy to see
that the challenger always carries out advertising under our requirements as ∂πE/∂A1E >
0. Since pooling is excluded in this case, the entrant’s advertising level may be high or
very small but always exceeds zero. Let us pick up (P 0I , A0I) ≡ (PI (c0I) , AI (c0I)) such that
πHI (P 0I , A0I) = πHI = (1− δ)πHI
¡
PHI , AHI
¢
+ δπHD
¡
AHI , 0
¢
and assume that πHI (P 0I , A0I) ≤eπHI = πHI (P I , AI) and A1E > 0. Then:
(1− δ)πHI
¡
PHI , AHI
¢
+ δπHD
¡
AHI , 0
¢
= πHI
¡
P 0I , A0I
¢
≤ (1− δ)πHI
¡
PHI , AHI
¢
+ δπHD
¡
AHI , A1E
¢
yielding:
πHD
¡
AHI , 0
¢
≤ πHD
¡
AHI , A1E
¢
(A7)
However, we know that ∂πHD/∂A1E < 0 ∀A1E > 0. Hence, A7 is s a contradiction, which
proves that (P I , AI), the game’s equilibrium underA1E > 0, must be located on an isoprofit
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curve that gives less profit to the incumbent than πHI . Due to monotonicity this proves
that Condition 1 is satisfied for cost-level cI that must be smaller than c0I .
Proof of Proposition 3. We first show that the equilibrium is always located
on the crestline ψ
¡
cL
¢
in the case that there is no diﬀerence in advertising eﬀectiveness
among the incumbent types. A maximum of πi(P,A), i ∈ {L,H}, is characterized by:
∇
£
(P − ci)X(P,A)−A
¤
=
−→
0
Let (P 0, A0) be the monopoly first-period maximizer for cost level c0. Assuming that in
such an equilibrium the isoprofit curves of πi(P,A) = (P − ci)X(P,A) − A, i ∈ {L,H},
are tangent to each other, then the gradients are parallel at this location and we have:
∇πL(P 0, A0) = λ∇πH(P 0, A0)
∇[P 0X(P 0, A0)−A0]− cL∇X(P 0, A0)
= λ∇[P 0X(P 0, A0)−A0]− cHλ∇X(P 0, A0)
Modification yields:
(1− λ)∇[P 0X(P 0, A0)−A0]−
¡
cL − λcH
¢
∇X(P 0, A0) = −→0
Since
¡
cL − cH
¢
∇X(P 0, A0) = −→0 and, because of cL 6= cH , ∇X(P 0, A0) = −→0 if λ = 1,
we exclude λ = 1. After modification we get:
∇[P 0X(P 0, A0)−A]− c
L − λcH
1− λ ∇X(P
0, A0) = −→0
where (cL − λcH)/ (1− λ) equals c0. Thus, we have:
∇
£
(P 0 − c0)X(P 0, A0)−A0
¤
=
−→
0
Thus, the osculation point of πH(P 0, A0) and πL(P 0, A0) is located exactly on the crestline
ψ
¡
cL
¢
at the the location where (P 0, A0) is the maximizer for cost level c0. This proves
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that the equilibrium is always located on the crestline ψ
¡
cL
¢
if both incumbent types
have equally eﬀective advertising.
Secondly, we show that the equilibrium is not located on the crestline if advertising
eﬀectiveness diﬀers between the two incumbent types. Because of ∂XL/∂A > ∂XH/∂A
for all A, the first-period maximizers for the types under the same cost level c0 can-
not be identical. Therefore, (P 0, A0) cannot be the equilibrium under our specification
XH (P,A) = XL (P,A) − bA. Define
³ bP, bA´ = P (bc) , A (bc) being the first-period maxi-
mizer for cost level bc and intersection point of bπH and ψ ¡cL¢. Assume ³ bP, bA´ being the
osculation point of bπH and πL( ePL, eAL), then the gradients of both isoprofit curves are
parallel at this point, and we have:
∇πL( bP, bA) = λ∇πH( bP, bA)
∇[ bPXL( bP, bA)− bA]− cL∇XL( bP, bA)
= λ∇[ bP ³XL( bP, bA)− b bA´− bA]− cHλ∇³XL( bP, bA)− b bA´
After modification, and exclusion of λ = 1, we get:
∇
h
( bPXL( bP, bA)− bAi− cL − λcH
1− λ X
L( bP, bA) + ∇
³ bP − cH´ b bA
1− λ =
−→
0
where (cL − λcH)/ (1− λ) equals bc, yielding:
∇
h
( bP − bc)XL( bP, bA)− bAi+ ∇
³ bP − cH´ b bA
1− λ =
−→
0
As λ 6= 1, and
³ bP − cH´ and b bA are positive numbers, the osculation point of
πL( ePL, eAL) and πH( bP, bA) = bπHI , is not located on the crestline ψ ¡cL¢, but above of
it.
Thirdly, we show that the equilibrium price-advertising pair provides a higher profit
to the low-cost incumbent than πL (P 0, A0), the equilibrium profit under equally eﬀective
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advertising. Assuming πH
³ bP, bA´ = (1− δ)πH ¡PH , AH¢+ δπHD = bπH ∩ψ ¡cL¢ is fulfilled
for pair
n³ bP, bA´o = (P (bc) , A (bc)) with cL > bc. From the proof of Proposition 1 we know
that the unique undominated separating equilibrium
³ ePL, eAL´ must be located on bπH .
Let the first-period maximizer of c0 under sales schedule XL be (P (c0) , A (c0)) = (P 0, A0)
and that of cH under XH be (P
¡
cH
¢
, A
¡
cH
¢
) =
¡
PH , AH
¢
. Assume that (P 0, A0) is
located on an isoprofit curve closer to
¡
PH , AH
¢
than
³ bP, bA´, then:
πH
¡
P 0, A0
¯¯
XH
¢
− πH
³ bP, bA ¯¯XH ´ > 0
Due to πH
³ bP, bA ¯¯XH ´ = bπH we can write:
πH
¡
P 0, A0
¯¯
XH
¢
− πH
¡
PH , AH
¯¯
XH
¢
+δ
£
πH
¡
PH , AH
¯¯
XH
¢
− πHD
¤
> 0
If δ = 0 then the term in brackets is zero and the whole term is clearly smaller than
zero, which is a contradiction. In this case we have bcI > c0I . As the term in parantheses
increases in δ, we need to verify if δ = 1 may let the inequation be valid. We yield:
πH
¡
P 0, A0
¯¯
XH
¢
− πHD > 0
Due to δ = 1 and πH
¡
P 0, A0
¯¯
XL
¢
= πH we know that:
πH
¡
P 0, A0
¯¯
XL
¢
− πHD = 0
where πHD is equal in both situations of advertising eﬀectiveness as first-period advertising
does not have an eﬀect on second-period sales. Thus, substituting zero yields:
πH
¡
P 0, A0
¯¯
XL
¢
− πH
¡
P 0, A0
¯¯
XH
¢
< 0
Using profit functions, we can write:
(P 0 − cH)
£
XH
¡
P 0, A0
¢
+ bA0
¤
−A0 − (P 0 − cH)XH
¡
P 0, A0
¢
+A0 < 0
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yielding: ¡
P 0 − cH
¢
bA0 < 0
which is a contradiction since
¡
P 0 − cH
¢
and bA0 are positive numbers. This proves
that bc > c0, i.e. bπH subtends ψ ¡cL¢ at a point closer to ¡PL, AL¢ than (P 0, A0).
Finally, we show that πL
³ bP, bA´ − πL (P 0, A0) > 0. From the proof above we know
that πH
³ bP, bA´− πH (P 0, A0) > 0. Thus, we can write:
( bP − cH)XH ³ bP, bA´− bA− (P 0 − cH)XH ¡P 0, A0¢+A0 > 0
(P 0 − c0)XH
¡
P 0, A0
¢
−A0 − ( bP − c0)XH ³ bP, bA´+ bA > 0
where the second inequality is valid due to monotonicity of g :
¤
0, cH
£
→ <, c 7−→
π
¡
ψ (c)
¯¯
cH
¢
=
£
ψ1 (c)− cH
¤
X [ψ (c)]−ψ2 (c) by intermediate value theorem using auxil-
iary function π
¡
ψ (c)
¯¯
cH
¢
, as shown in the proof of Theorem 2 in Bagwell/Ramey. Adding
the two inequalities yields:¡
cH − c0
¢ h
XH
¡
P 0, A0
¢
−XH
³ bP, bA´i > 0 (A8)
givingXH (P 0, A0) > XH
³ bP, bA´ because of cH > c0. Assume πH (P 0, A0)−πH ³ bP, bA´ >
0, then:
(P 0 − cL)
£
XH
¡
P 0, A0
¢
+ bA0
¤
−A0 − ( bP − cL) hXH ³ bP, bA´+ b bAi+ bA > 0 (A9)
( bP − bc) hXH ³ bP, bA´+ b bAi− bA− (P 0 − bc) £XH ¡P 0, A0¢+ bA0¤+A0 > 0
where the second inequality is true due to monotonicity of π
¡
ψ (c)
¯¯
cL
¢
. Adding yields:h
XH
³ bP, bA´−XH ¡P 0, A0¢i+ b³ bA−A0´ > 0
which is wrong due to A8 and because of A0 > bA, where the latter follows from the
Dorfman-Steiner equation. Thus, A9 is a contradiction. This shows that πL
³ bP, bA´ −
πL (P 0, A0) > 0, and thus πL
³ ePL, eAL´ > πL (P 0, A0), which supports a separating equi-
librium with properties as shown above.
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Notes
[1] Note that we actually cannot speak of an ”intersection point” of πH and ψ
¡
cL
¢
at³ bP, bA´ = (P (bc) , AI (bc)) here. The reason is that ψ ¡cL¢ at point ³ bP, bA´ is running far
above of πH in the three-dimensional space, i.e. π
³ bP, bA |bc´ > πH at cI = bcI . We keep the
term ”intersection” nevertheless, and thereby mean intersection in the two-dimensional
space spanned by variables P and A.
[2] Maple by Maplesoft, 615 Kumpf Drive, Waterloo, Ontario, Canada, N2V 1K8. The
example can be requested from the authors.
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